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1 Introduction
Recent studies argued that the allocation of production resources among firms or sectors is a
key driver behind the growth of aggregate total factor productivity (TFP) (Restuccia and Roger-
son, 2008; Hsieh and Klenow, 2009; Bartelsman et al., 2013; Collard-Wexler and De Loecker,
2015). Their argument is that the shift in production resources from less productive to more
productive units yields an increase in aggregate TFP and that resource allocation eciency is
crucial to explaining countries’ aggregate TFP. A well-functioning market economy can allo-
cate more production resources to more productive businesses. Because developing economies
are generally found to have lower allocation eciency than developed economies, improving
resource allocation is expected to increase their aggregate TFP and GDP per capita. Therefore,
developing an appropriate measure of allocation eciency and theoretically and empirically
investigating the sources of misallocation are crucial to implementing better economic policies.
In this paper, the author develops an extended quantitative measure of allocation eciency.
Two types of empirical measures of allocation eciency have been used in previous studies:
(1) the dispersion of firm-level productivity (Hsieh and Klenow, 2009) and (2) the covariance
between a firm’s market share and productivity (Olley and Pakes, 1996; Collard-Wexler and
De Loecker, 2013; Melitz and Polanec, 2015). According to Bartelsman et al. (2013), the
covariance measure is a robust theoretical and empirical measure to assess the eect of misallo-
cation. The covariance measure was originally proposed by Olley and Pakes (1996), Melitz and
Polanec (2015) extended it to capture the contributions of entering and exiting firms, calling
it the dynamic Olley-Pakes (OP) productivity decomposition. However, the dynamic and non-
dynamic (i.e., original) OP decomposition do not capture allocation eciency between groups
(e.g., industrial sectors, ownership groups); they only capture allocation eciency within a
group. This paper attempts to extend the OP decomposition to a multi-group version to simul-
taneously capture the degree of allocation eciency within a group and between groups and
parallel to capturing the contribution of entering and exiting firms.
The extended productivity decomposition method is applied to China’s manufacturing firm-
level data from 2004 to 2007. Several scholars estimated the degree of allocation eciency
in China. However, some debate has occurred over its recent trend. For example, Hsieh and
Klenow (2009) used manufacturing firm-level data from 1998 to 2005 to measure the degree
of misallocation. They found that misallocation within an industry tended to decline over time.
Meanwhile, Chen et al. (2011) used industry-level data from 1980 to 2008 and found that
factor reallocation played a substantial role in increasing aggregate productivity from 1980 to
2000; however, after 2001, they found that allocation eciency worsened and contributed to
decreasing productivity growth. Brandt et al. (2013) also used industry-level data by province
from 1985 to 2007 and found that misallocation within provinces declined between 1985 and
1997 but increased in the last 10 years. Has China’s allocation eciency worsened since the
2000s? What is the extent of its allocation eciency among industrial sectors and ownership
groups? The investigations into China’s allocation eciency remain insucient.
This paper addresses these questions using the extended measure of allocation eciency.
The empirical analysis has two steps. First, firm-level productivity is estimated using a struc-
tural estimation method proposed by Gandhi et al. (2013). Second, the productivity decompo-
sition method is exploited to quantify the eect of misallocation on aggregate manufacturing
productivity. Hence, misallocation between industrial sectors is revealed as increasing over
time, and changes in misallocation between industrial groups have a more significant eect
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on aggregate TFP growth than eect of misallocation changes within an industry. Misalloca-
tion within an industry is found to increase in industries that use more capital and have firms
with relatively higher state-owned market shares. However, allocation eciency between three
ownership sectors (state-owned, domestic private, and foreign sectors) tends to improve in in-
dustries in which the market share moves from a less-productive state-owned sector to a more
productive private sector. However, this eciency tends to worsen in industries in which 1)
the state-owned sector’s TFP increases on relative basis despite decreases in its market share or
2) the private sector’s TFP does not grow compared with other sectors despite increases in its
market share.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the measure of
allocation eciency used in this study. Section 3 describes the TFP estimation procedure, and
Section 4 presents the data sources and estimation results of productivity. Section 5 reports the
allocation eciency in China, and Section 6 concludes.
2 Measure of Allocation Eciency
The measure of allocation eciency used in this paper is based on a productivity decomposi-
tion method originally developed by Olley and Pakes (OP; 1996) and extended by Melitz and
Polanec (MP; 2015) to a dynamic version. Sections 2.1 and 2.2 review the OP and MP meth-
ods, and Section 2.3 describes the extended version of their methods. Section 5.2 reports the
empirical results of China’s allocation eciency.
2.1 Olley-Pakes Decomposition
Let us consider aggregate productivity (t), which is defined as the weighted average of firm-
level productivity: t =
P
i2
t sitit, where 
t is the set of firms at time t, it is the firm-level log
TFP, and sit is firm i’s share of output at time t. Olley and Pakes (1996) showed that aggregate
productivity can be decomposed into the following two parts:
t =
X
i2
t
sitit =
1
Nt
X
i2
t
it +
X
i2
t
0BBBBBB@sit   1Nt
X
2
t
st
1CCCCCCA
0BBBBBB@it   1Nt
X
2
t
t
1CCCCCCA
= t + covt
(1)
where t represents the unweighted mean productivity and covt is proportional to the covari-
ance between market shares and productivity. covt represents the magnitude of allocation e-
ciency because it increases as more-productive firms have higher market shares, and conversely,
it decreases as less productive firms have higher market shares. Olley and Pakes (1996) used
plant-level panel data on the U.S. telecommunications equipment industry from 1974 to 1987 to
estimate plant-level productivity for the industry and then exploited it to calculate OP decom-
position. They found that the unweighted mean productivity (t) did not change much since
1975, but the covariance term increased from 0.01 in 1974 to 0.32 in 1987. They concluded that
a factor reallocation occurred from less-productive to more-productive plants.
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2.2 Dynamic Olley-Pakes Decomposition
Melitz and Polanec (2015) extended the OP decomposition to capture the contribution of en-
tering and exiting firms in aggregate productivity, which is called the dynamic Olley-Pakes
productivity decomposition. They showed that the dierence in the aggregate log TFP at times
1 and 2 ( = 2   1) can be decomposed into the following parts: (1) unweighted TFP
of firms surviving during the period, (2) the OP’s covariance term calculated using surviving
firms’ log TFP and market shares, and (3) the contribution of entering and exiting firms during
the period.
The dynamic Olley-Pakes (DOP) decomposition is derived as follows. First, the aggregate
log TFP at time 1 (1) is decomposed into surviving firms’ log TFP at time 1 and exiting firms’
log TFP at time 1:
1 =
X
i2
S
si1i1 +
X
i2
X
si1i1
= S1 + s
X
1

X1   S1

;
(2)
where 
S and 
X denote the sets of surviving and exiting firms during the period and S1 and
X1 are the aggregate log TFPs at time 1 for surviving and exiting firms, respectively:
S1 =
X
i2
S
si1P
2
S s1
i1; 
X
1 =
X
i2
X
si1P
2
X s1
i1; sX1 =
X
i2
X
si1:
Similarly, the aggregate log TFP at time 2 is decomposed into surviving firms’ log TFP at time
2 and entering firms’ log TFP at time 2:
2 =
X
i2
S
si2i2 +
X
i2
E
si2i2
= S2 + s
E
2

E2   S2

;
(3)
where 
E denotes the set of entering firms during the period and S2 and 
E
2 are the aggregate
log TFPs at time 2 for surviving firms and entering firms, respectively:
S2 =
X
i2
S
si2P
2
S s2
i2; 
E
2 =
X
i2
E
si2P
2
E s2
i2; sE2 =
X
i2
E
si2:
Applying the OP decomposition to St (t = 1; 2) yields:
St =
1
NS
X
i2
S
it +
X
i2
S
0BBBBBB@ sitP
2
S st
  1
NS
X
i2
S
sitP
2
S st
1CCCCCCA
0BBBBBB@it   1NS
X
i2
S
it
1CCCCCCA
= St + cov
S
t ;
(4)
where NS is the number of firms surviving during the period, St is the unweighted mean pro-
ductivity of surviving firms, and covSt represents the magnitude of allocation eciency among
surviving firms. Substituting Equation (4) in Equations (2) and (3) and taking the dierence of
the aggregate log TFP ( = 2   1) results in the DOP decomposition as follows:
 = S + covS + sE2 (
E
2   S2 ) + sX1 (S1   X1 )
= S + covS + ent + ext ;
(5)
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where S = S2   S1 , covS = covS2   covS1 , ent = sE2 (E2   S2 ), and ext = sX1 (S1   X1 ).
The first term on right-hand side is the change in the unweighted average log TFP for surviving
firms. The second term is the change in the covariance, which indicates the change in the
magnitude of allocation eciency among surviving firms. The contributions of entering and
exiting firms appear in ent and ext, respectively, both of which are evaluated in comparison
with the productivity of surviving firms as follows:
ent Q 0 when E2 Q 
S
2 ;
ext Q 0 when S1 Q 
X
1 :
Thus, the DOP decomposition method allows us to identify the contributions of entering and
exiting firms.
Melitz and Polanec (2015) used firm-level panel data from the Slovenian manufacturing
sector from 1995 to 2000 to estimate the parameters of a production function for the industry
and then calculated the DOP decomposition using the estimated log TFP and the log of labor
productivity. They found that the aggregate log TFP change () from 1995 to 2000 is 0.4013
and is decomposed into the unweighted mean productivity for surviving firms (S = 0:2758),
the covariance term change (covS = 0:0955), and the contributions of entering and exiting
firms (ent = 0:0021, ext = 0:0279). Their results indicate that the improvement in allocation
eciency added 10 percentage points to aggregate TFP growth during the five years.
2.3 Extension of the OP and Dynamic OP Decompositions
The OP and DOP decompositions allow us to quantify the degree of allocation eciency within
a group (e.g., an industrial sector). However, these quantifications can be augmented to a multi-
group version to simultaneously capture the degree of allocation eciency within a group and
between groups. This section shows the augmented version of the OP and DOP decomposition.
2.3.1 Augmented OP (AOP) Decomposition
Let us consider that the number of groups is J and aggregate productivity is represented as:
t =
XJ
j=1
w jt
X
i2
 jt
sit
w jt
it
=
XJ
j=1
w jt ˜ jt;
where 
 jt is the set of firms in group j at time t, w jt is group j’s output share at time t, and ˜ jt =P
i2
 jt(sit=w jt)it is the weighted average log TFP for group j. Applying the OP decomposition
to the above equation yields:
t =
1
J
XJ
j=1
˜ jt +
XJ
j=1
 
w jt   1J
XJ
=1
wt
!  
˜ jt   1J
XJ
=1
˜t
!
=
1
J
XJ
j=1
˜ jt + ˜covt ;
(6)
where ˜covt represents the magnitude of inter-group allocation eciency. This paper defines the
first and second terms as “within-eect” and “between-eect,” respectively.
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The ˜ jt in the within-eect can be decomposed as:
˜ jt =
1
N jt
X
i2
 jt
it +
X
i2
 jt
0BBBBBBB@ sitw jt   1N jt
X
2
 jt
st
w jt
1CCCCCCCA
0BBBBBBB@it   1N jt
X
2
 jt
t
1CCCCCCCA
=  jt + cov jt ;
(7)
where N jt is the number of firms in group j at time t. Substituting Equation (7) in Equation (6)
yields the augmented OP (AOP) decomposition as follows:
t =
1
J
XJ
j=1
 jt +
1
J
XJ
j=1
cov jt|                              {z                              }
Within eect
+ ˜covt|{z}
Between eect
: (8)
The first term in Equation (8) is the unweighted mean productivity, and cov jt and ˜covt represent
the degree of allocation eciency within group j and between groups, respectively. When
J = 1, Equation (8) reduces to the original OP decomposition. Taking the dierence in Equation
(8) yields:
 =
1
J
XJ
j=1
 j +
1
J
XJ
j=1
cov j +  ˜cov : (9)
2.3.2 Augmented Dynamic OP (ADOP) Decomposition
The dynamic OP decomposition is also extended to a multi-group case. First, as in the case of
the OP decomposition, the aggregate log TFP at time 1 can be decomposed into within- and
between-eects:
1 =
1
J
XJ
j=1
˜ j1 + ˜cov1 ; (10)
where ˜ j1 =
P
i2
 j1(si1=w j1)i1 and ˜cov1 =
PJ
j=1(w j1   w1)(˜ j1   ˜1). w1 and ˜1 denote simple
averages of w j1 and ˜ j1, respectively. The weight ai j1 = si1=w j1 can be written asX
i2
 j1
ai j1 =
X
i2
Sj
ai j1 +
X
i2
Xj
ai j1
= aSj1 + a
X
j1 = 1:
where 
Sj and 

X
j denote the sets of surviving and exiting firms for group j, respectively. They
can be decomposed into the weighted average log TFP of surviving firms and the contribution
of exiting firms:
˜ j1 =
X
i2
Sj
ai j1
aSj1
i1 + aXj1
0BBBBBBBBB@X
i2
Xj
ai j1
aXj1
i1  
X
i2
Sj
ai j1
aSj1
i1
1CCCCCCCCCA
= Sj1 + a
X
j1

Xj1   Sj1

= Sj1   ext j;
(11)
whereSj1 and
X
j1 denote the weighted average log TFP of surviving and exiting firms for group
j, respectively, and ext j = aXj1

Sj1   Xj1

represents the contribution of exiting firms to group
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j’s aggregate productivity ˜ j1. By exploiting the OP decomposition method, the first term of
Equation (11) can be decomposed as:
Sj1 =
1
NSj1
X
i2
Sj
i1 +
X
i2
Sj
0BBBBBBBBB@ai j1aSj1   1NSj1
X
2
Sj
a j1
aSj1
1CCCCCCCCCA
0BBBBBBBBB@i1   1NSj1
X
2
Sj
1
1CCCCCCCCCA
= Sj1 + cov
S
j1;
(12)
where Sj1 is the simple average log TFP of surviving firms at time 1 and cov
S
j1 is the degree of
allocation eciency within group j at time 1. Substituting Equations (12) and (11) in Equation
(10) yields the following decomposition:
1 =
1
J
XJ
j=1

Sj1 + cov
S
j1   ext j

|                              {z                              }
Within eect
+ ˜cov1|{z}
Between eect
: (13)
Similarly, the aggregate log TFP at time 2 can be decomposed as follows:
2 =
1
J
XJ
j=1
˜ j2 + ˜cov2
=
1
J
XJ
j=1

Sj2 + a
E
j2

Ej2   Sj2

+ ˜cov2
=
1
J
XJ
j=1

Sj2 + cov
S
j2 + ent j

|                              {z                              }
Within eect
+ ˜cov2|{z}
Between eect
;
(14)
where ent j = aEj2

Ej2   Sj2

indicates the contribution of entering firms to aggregate produc-
tivity ˜ j2.
Finally, taking the dierence between 1 and 2, the augmented dynamic OP (ADOP)
decomposition is obtained:
 =
1
J
XJ
j=1

Sj + cov
S
j + ent j + ext j

|                                           {z                                           }
Within eect
+  ˜cov|{z}
Between eect
(15)
where covSj represents the changes in allocation eciency among surviving firms within group
j and  ˜cov represents the changes in allocation eciency between groups. When J = 1, Equa-
tion (14) reduces to the original dynamic OP decomposition. The definition of  ˜cov in Equation
(15) is the same as that of Equation (9).
In this paper, Equations (9) and (15) are used to decompose China’s aggregate productivity
and investigate the magnitude of allocation eciency. The empirical results are described in
Section 5. Before reporting the results, the next section explains how to measure firm-level
productivity (it).
3 Production Function Estimation
Having clarified the measure of allocation eciency in the previous section, showing the mea-
sure of firm-level productivity is required. This paper employs the structural estimation method
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proposed by Gandhi et al. (GNR; 2013) to measure China’s firm-level productivity. This
method is built on the recent literature on production function estimation, such as Olley and
Pakes (1996), Levinsohn and Petrin (LP; 2003), and Ackerberg et al. (ACF; 2006). Following
GNR (2013), this section describes the framework of firm behavior and shows the identification
strategy of the production function.
3.1 Model of Firm Behavior
Let us consider that firm i operates through discrete time t and produces output using labor Lit,
capital Kit, and intermediate inputs Mit. The firm’s anticipated output Qit is assumed to depend
on these inputs, and the anticipated productivity level !it. !it represents a firm’s technology,
information, knowledge, or situation that aects its productivity; this can be observed by firm
i, but not by the econometrician. For example, !it represents business management dierences,
deviations from expected machine breakdown rates in a particular period, or labor management
problems.
At the beginning of each period, firm i can observe !it, which aects current and future
input decisions. The relationship between Qit and the inputs in period t is expressed as:
Qit = F(Kit; Lit;Mit) expf!itg; (16)
Yit = Qit exp f"itg; (17)
) Yit = F(Kit; Lit;Mit) expf!it + "itg; (18)
where F() is a production function and Yit is the measured output observed by the econometri-
cian. The dierence between Qit and Yit is "it, representing an unanticipated productivity shock
and/or measurement error that cannot be observed by firm i before making period t’s input de-
cisions. TFP is defined as expf!it + "itg. Taking the logarithm for both sides of Equation (18)
yields:
yit = f (kit; lit;mit) + !it + "it; (19)
log TFPit = !it + "it;
where the lower-case letters denote the logs of their upper-case letters. Identifying f (kit; lit;mit)
is required to estimate TFP.
As in OP (1996), LP (2003), ACF (2006), and GNR (2013), assumptions about the dynamics
of productivity and the timing of input decisions are required to identify the production function.
First, the anticipated productivity !it evolves over time according to the first-order Markov
process and is decomposed into its conditional expectation given all information (i;t 1) known
by the firm at t   1 and a residual (it). Thus, !it can be expressed as:
!it = E(!it j i;t 1) + it
= E(!it j !i;t 1) + it
= g(!i;t 1) + it;
(20)
where it is, by definition, uncorrelated to g(!i;t 1) because it is defined as new information not
available in period t   1, which is frequently referred to as an innovation at t. The innovation it
and the ex post shock "it are assumed to be mean zero random variables. Equation (19) can be
rewritten as:
yit = f (kit; lit;mit) + g(!i;t 1) + it + "it: (21)
8
For the timing of input decisions, as with GNR, labor and capital inputs at t are assumed to
be decided at or before t 1, implying that these inputs are quasi-fixed inputs and that adjustment
costs exist in labor and capital (e.g., hiring/firing, job training, or machine installation costs).
Under these timing assumptions, labor and capital inputs can be regarded as state variables for
firms, and they are orthogonal to the innovation at t, i.e., E(it j kit; lit) = 0. This moment
condition is required to identify the elasticities associated with labor and capital inputs.
The intermediate input Mit is assumed to be a flexible input, which is variable in each period
and does not have dynamic implications. Therefore, its level at t does not aect the firm’s profit
in the future. At the beginning of each period, given the levels of labor, capital inputs, and !it,
firm i chooses the level of Mit. Consequently, Mit is an implicit function of Kit, Lit, !it, and the
output and intermediate input prices. This result implies two points. First, Mit is an endogenous
variable because it partly depends on !it, which cannot be observed by the econometrician.
Second, no source of cross-sectional variation exists in Mit other than the remaining inputs: Kit,
Lit, and !it. In other words, Mit is “collinear” with the other productive inputs. As a result,
the identification problem arises with flexible input, which was pointed out by Marschak and
Andrews (1944), Bond and So¨derbom (2005), ACF (2006), and GNR (2013). To address this
problem, ACF (2006) suggested strategies using value-added production functions to remove
flexible inputs, such as an intermediate input, whereas Wooldridge (2009) proposed the use
of lagged inputs decisions as instruments. However, GNR (2013) argued that these solutions
are incomplete and showed that TFP estimates based on value-added functions have significant
bias and that Wooldridge’s approach does not solve the collinearity problem. GNR (2013)
proposed an alternative approach to solving the identification problem based on gross output
production functions, including both quasi-fixed inputs and flexible inputs. This paper employs
their identification strategy.
3.2 Identification
For estimation purposes, a translo-type production function is used for f (kit; lit;mit):
yit = kkit + llit + mmit
+ kkk2it + lll
2
it + mmm
2
it
+ klkitlit + lmlitmit + kmkitmit
+ !it + "it;
(22)
where a constant term of the production function is included in !it. GNR’s identification strat-
egy consists of two stages. The first stage involves estimating parameters associated with the
intermediate input by using the firm’s first-order condition with respect to Mit under perfect
competition in the input and output markets:
PtFM(Kit; Lit;Mit) exp f!itg = t; (23)
where FM() = @F()=@Mit, and Pt and t denote the output and intermediate input prices,
respectively. Multiplying both sides of Equation (23) by Mit=PtYit yields the revenue share of
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the intermediate input:
S it =
tMit
PtYit
= PtFM(Kit; Lit;Mit)
Mit
PtYit
expf!itg
= FM(Kit; Lit;Mit)
Mit
F(Kit; Lit;Mit) expf!it + "itg expf!itg
= FM(Kit; Lit;Mit)
Mit
F(Kit; Lit;Mit)
1
expf"itg
= G(Kit; Lit;Mit)
1
exp f"itg ;
(24)
where G() is the elasticity of the anticipated output with respect to Mit. Taking the logarithm
of both sides of Equation (24) enables the share equation to be rewritten as:
sit = log it   "it; (25)
where sit = log S it and  it = G(Kit; Lit;Mit). Because "it is the ex post shock that is, by definition,
uncorrelated with the input decisions, log  it can be identified by the non-parametric regression
of sit on log  it.1) The estimates  ˆit and "ˆit = sit   log  ˆit are used to identify the parameters in
Equation (22). Based on the production function in Equation (22), the elasticity associated with
Mit can be written as:
eit(1) = m + mm2mit + kmkit + lmlit; (26)
where 1 = (m; mm; km; lm)0. Given the observation, because Equation (26) depends only on
the parameters associated with Mit, we can recover 1 by minimizing the distance between  ˆit
and eit(1):
min
1
X
t
X
i
h
 ˆit   eit(1)
i2
: (27)
The second stage identifies the remaining parameters associated with kit and lit by using the
moment conditions E(it j kit; lit) = 0. Given the estimates for ˆ1 and "ˆit obtained in the first
stage, !it can be written as:
!it = yit   ˆmmit   ˆmmm2it   ˆkmkitmit   ˆlmlitmit   "ˆit
  kkit   llit   kkk2it   lll2it   klkitlit
= yit   z1itˆ1   z2it2   "ˆit
= y˜it   z2it2
(28)
where y˜it = yit   z1itˆ1   "ˆit, and:
z1it =
h
mit m2it kitmit litmit
i
;
z2it =
h
kit lit k2it l
2
it kitlit
i
;
2 =
h
k l kk ll kl
i0
:
1)In this paper, log  it is approximated by a third-order polynomial in kit, lit, and mit.
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Given the estimates ˆ1 and "ˆit, !it is a function of 2. Consequently, it in Equation (20) can be
written as:
it(2) = !it(2)   g(!i;t 1(2)): (29)
Because it is, by definition, orthogonal to kit and lit, the moment condition E(z2it it) = 0 can be
used to identify 2. Using the sample analogue of the moment condition,
sz2 =
1
N
X
i2N
1
Ti
X
t2Ti
z2it it(2) = 0; (30)
the estimate of 2 can be identified. The specific steps are as follows. Given the initial value
of 2, ˆit is non-parametrically estimated using Equations (28) and (29), and ˆ2 can then be
obtained by minimizing the value of a function '(2) = sˆ0z2 sˆz2 with respect to 2.
2) Having
obtained the estimates of 1 and 2 in this identification strategy, TFP can be recovered as
follows:
ˆTFPit = expfyit   z1itˆ1   z2itˆ2g: (31)
4 Data and Estimation Results
4.1 Data Description
The data used for the estimation are based on unbalanced firm-level panel data on China’s man-
ufacturing industry from 2004 to 2007, which are obtained from the annual survey of industrial
enterprises conducted by the National Bureau of Statistics. The survey covers firms with sales
higher than 5 million RMB in the mining, manufacturing, and public utilities industries, and the
original database consists of 336,768 industry firms for 2007, which is the same number as that
reported in the China Statistical Yearbook published in 2008 (p. 485). Firm IDs contained in
the database are used to construct a panel of observations.3)
The production function variables are constructed as follows: Yit is the total gross output, Kit
is the total fixed assets, Lit is the number of employees, and Mit is the total intermediate inputs.
The deflators for Yit and Mit are based on the output and input deflators provided by Brandt, et
al. (2012).4) The deflator for total fixed assets is constructed as follows.
(1) Firm-level total fixed-asset data at current prices are gathered by province. The province-
level data are denoted by K˜pt, where p denotes a province.
(2) The provincial nominal investment is calculated as I˜it = K˜pt   (1   )K˜p;t 1. Following
Brandt et al. (2012), the depreciation rate  is set at 0.09.
2)g(!i;t 1(2)) in Equation (29) is approximated by a third-order polynomial in !i;t 1(2). The Nelder-Mead
method is used for the minimization of '(2).
3)However, this IDs are often missing or changes over time. Hence, this paper creates a new series of firm IDs
by using firm attributes, such as original firm IDs, firm names, the names of legal representatives, phone numbers,
and city codes. Firm-matching is conducted by STATA. It is based on but is not the same as the algorithm in Brandt
et al. (2012). Their algorithm is described in their online appendix:
http://www.econ.kuleuven.be/public/n07057/china/.
4)See their online appendix: http://www.econ.kuleuven.be/public/n07057/china/.
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(3) I˜it is deflated by a province-level investment deflator, which is obtained from the China
Statistical Yearbook. Using the deflated investment (Ipt), provincial deflated fixed assets
are calculated as Kpt = (1   )Kp;t 1 + Ipt, where Kp0 = K˜p0.
(4) The deflator for total fixed assets by province can be calculated using K˜pt and Kpt.
Firms with a non-positive value for Yit, Kit, Lit, and Mit are dropped from the database.
Table 1: Summary Statistics
Average
Num Output Fixed assets Labor Intermediate
All (2004) 246403 68843.1 22764.7 225.6 53252.3
All (2005) 243333 83349.6 26578.3 238.5 63594.3
All (2006) 271446 92161.9 27710.6 227.9 69865.5
All (2007) 306452 101843.7 28564.3 218.9 76821.5
State (2004) 13464 115096.4 71827.8 463.5 88494.6
State (2005) 9793 179316.1 107357.2 596.6 136711.4
State (2006) 8468 221442.7 131736.6 617.7 170184.0
State (2007) 6157 347542.9 190751.0 781.9 269392.1
Private+ (2004) 177744 51451.8 16101.9 180.6 39631.0
Private+ (2005) 178467 62454.1 18763.9 188.0 47801.3
Private+ (2006) 203758 68820.2 19217.4 177.6 52368.6
Private+ (2007) 234338 75686.2 19678.1 168.4 56955.1
Foreign (2004) 55195 113565.5 32252.7 312.5 88520.0
Foreign (2005) 55073 133997.6 37537.0 338.2 101771.1
Foreign (2006) 59220 153987.6 42058.0 345.2 115722.1
Foreign (2007) 65957 171842.9 44995.9 345.8 129428.7
Table 1 reports summary statistics on the panel data by ownership sector.5) “State” de-
notes state-owned firms, including state-owned enterprises and solely state-funded corporations.
“Private+” denotes domestic and non-state-owned firms, including collective-owned firms (and
other hybrids) and privately funded enterprises. “Foreign” denotes firms with funds from Hong
Kong, Macao, and Taiwan and those that are purely foreign-funded enterprises. The State sector
shows the smallest number of firms and a sharp decrease of 54% from 2004 to 2007, whereas
the number of private and foreign firms increased during the three years. The Private+ sector
has the largest number of firms, accounting for 76% of the total in 2007. However, its output
per firm is nearly five times smaller than that of state-owned firms in 2007, indicating that most
private firms operate as small entities compared with state and foreign firms.
4.2 TFP and Output Elasticities
The production function in Equation (22) is separately estimated by industry using a three-digit
industrial code.6) Appendix Tables A1–A4 report the estimates of the average output elastic-
ities for each input and the sum of the elasticities for capital, labor, and intermediate inputs.
The estimates of GNR’s method are found to show lower average elasticities of intermediate
inputs (M) than the OLS estimates in every industry. The dierence between the GNR and
5)The tobacco industry is excluded from the database.
6)Tobacco (industrial codes 161, 162, and 169), and nuclear-related industries (253 and 424) are eliminated from
the sample. Industries 212, 214, 233, 402, and 423 are included in 211, 219, 232, 409, and 429, respectively. The
estimation is implemented using R version 3.0.0 (R Development Core Team, 2009).
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OLS estimates of M is 0.155 on average, and the OLS estimates are approximately 1.21 times
higher on average than the GNR estimates. These results are clearly expected and consistent
with the estimation results in GNR (2013). The failure to control the endogenous bias from the
correlation between flexible variables and unobservable productivity (!it) is known to lead to
overestimates of the coecients on flexible variables because positive productivity shocks are
likely to increase the use of flexible inputs. The average elasticities of capital and labor as esti-
mated by OLS are lower than the estimates based on the GNR method, which is also consistent
with the empirical results in GNR (2013).
China’s intermediate input elasticities shown in Appendix Tables A1–A4 are higher than
Colombia’s and Chile’s as estimated by GNR (2013). The data used in GNR (2013) are based
on five three-digit manufacturing industries, and their estimates of input elasticities for these
industries are 0.71 (Food Products), 0.56 (Textiles), 0.53 (Apparel), 0.53 (Wood Products), and
0.54 (Fabricated Metal Products) for Colombia, and 0.69, 057, 0.58, 0.62, and 0.53 for Chile,
respectively. Compared with this paper’s estimates of the nearly corresponding industries (131,
171, 181, 203, and 341), Colombia’s and Chile’s estimates are lower in every case, indicating
that China’s manufacturing production depends more on intermediate inputs.
5 Allocation Eciency
This section presents the results of the augmented OP and dynamic OP (AOP and ADOP) de-
composition using China’s manufacturing firm-level productivity. These methods enable us to
simultaneously quantify allocation eciency within a group and between groups. The defini-
tion of group j is required for this analysis. Section 5.1 shows the results based on the group
defined as having 159 three-digit industrial sectors ( j = 1; 2; : : : ; J; J = 159), and Section 5.2
reports the results based on the group defined as having three ownership sectors ( j = State,
Private+, Foreign; J = 3).
5.1 Allocation Eciency of 3-digit Industrial Sectors
Table 2 reports the results of the AOP and ADOP decomposition based on the group of three-
digit industrial sectors (J = 159). The change rate of the aggregate log TFP from 2004 to 2007
is 10.80%, and its annual average is 2.70%. Annual TFP growth rates tend to decrease annu-
ally, such as 4.36% for 2004–05, 3.93% for 2005–06, and 2.51% for 2006–07. These figures
are smaller than those estimated by Brandt, et al (2012), who showed that the annual average
growth of aggregate TFP is 2.85% for a gross output production function from 1998 to 2007
(Brandt, et al., 2012, Table 2). However, the sample periods and estimation methods of this pa-
per dier from their paper, and these results indicate the possibility that China’s manufacturing
TFP growth tended to slow after 2004.
The ADOP decomposition reveals that new entering firms during 2004–2007 decreased
aggregate manufacturing TFP by  1.20% points, whereas exiting firms increased it by 0.6%
points. In the case of Slovenian manufacturing, the contribution of entering and exiting firms
during 1995–2000 was 0.21% and 2.79% points, respectively (Melitz and Polanec, 2015). The
contribution of China’s exiting firms on productivity is positive; however, the magnitude is
much smaller than that in Slovenia’s case. These results indicate that entering firms in China
are less ecient than surviving firms, whereas the exiting firms are slightly more inecient
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Table 2: TFP Decomposition (J = 159: three-digit industrial code)
(I) Augmented Olley-Pakes Decomposition
Total Within Between
 J 1
P
j ˜ j  ˜cov
J 1
P
j  j J 1
P
j cov j
2004–2005 0.0436 0.0619 0.0524 0.0095  0.0183
2005–2006 0.0393 0.0494 0.0510  0.0015  0.0101
2006–2007 0.0251 0.0221 0.0367  0.0146 0.0030
2004–2007 0.1080 0.1334 0.1401  0.0066  0.0254
(II) Augmented Dynamic Olley-Pakes Decomposition
Total Within Between
 J 1
P
j ˜ j  ˜cov
J 1
P
j 
S
j J
 1P
j covSj J
 1P
j ent j J 1
P
j ext j
2004–2005 0.0436 0.0619 0.0551 0.0080  0.0037 0.0025  0.0183
2005–2006 0.0393 0.0494 0.0553  0.0013  0.0066 0.0020  0.0101
2006–2007 0.0251 0.0221 0.0395  0.0115  0.0075 0.0016 0.0030
2004–2007 0.1080 0.1334 0.1347 0.0047  0.0120 0.0060  0.0254
than are surviving firms. However, the average productivity gap between exiting and surviving
firms is quite small, compared with Slovenia’s case. The entry and exit of manufacturing firms
does not seem to contribute to the increase in aggregate TFP growth in China.
The contribution of allocation eciency between groups ( ˜cov) to the aggregate manu-
facturing TFP growth is  0.0254 for 2004–2007. If  ˜cov was zero during 2004–2007, the
aggregate log TFP change rate () would increase to 13.34% in Panel (I) and 13.47% in Panel
(II), and these annual averages would be 3.34% and 3.37%, respectively. These results indi-
cate that resource allocation among three-digit industrial sectors tends to worsen during this
period, although the annual change rates increase over time. In contrast, the changes in the
average allocation eciency within each group are  0.0066 (AOP decomposition) and 0.0047
(ADOP decomposition), which indicate opposite signs for AOP and ADOP and small magni-
tudes. The changes in allocation eciency between the groups are found to aect the aggregate
TFP changes more than those of the within-group allocation eciency. The increase in misal-
location between industrial sectors reduces aggregate TFP growth during 2004–2007 by annual
average of 0.635% points.
Because the within allocation eciency shown in Table 2 is the average of 159 three-digit
sectors, the magnitude of the within eect for each sector is likely to vary among sectors. Fig-
ure 1 shows a histogram of AOP and ADOP’s covariance terms within each sector (cov j and
covSj ), which indicates that not all industries have negative values. However, the range is
from approximately 0.20 to  0.25 (without industry 379), and the number of sectors having
positive values is 87 industries for the AOP decomposition and 99 industries for the ADOP
decomposition. Furthermore, Panel (III) in the figure indicates a gap between the AOP and
ADOP covariance terms. Considering the meaning of this gap is useful. AOP’s covariance
change includes the contributions of both surviving firms and exiting-entering firms to the de-
gree of allocation eciency. In contrast, for ADOP, the focus is only on the change in allocation
eciency among surviving firms. Consequently, the dierence in cov j   covSj implies the
contributions of exiting firms and entering firms to the change in the allocation eciency within
sector j. A positive gap leads to the interpretation that exiting and/or entering firms contribute
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Figure 1: Allocation eciency within each industrial sector.
Notes: The vertical axis represents the number of three-digit industrial sectors. The horizontal
axis is defined as cov j for panel (I), covSj for panel (II), and cov j  covSj for panel (III).
to improving allocation eciency. As shown in Panel (III) of Figure 1, the gap diers among
sectors and ranges from  0.16 to 0.21. The average is  0.011, and 107 of 159 sectors (67%)
are plotted in the negative area, indicating that a firm’s entry to and/or exit from the market does
not necessarily contribute to improving China’s manufacturing allocation eciency.
What causes the dierence in the within allocation eciency (cov j and covSj ) among
industrial sectors? Chen, et al. (2011) argued that the changes in China’s allocation eciency
have a negative relationship with the capital-labor ratio and the market shares of state-owned
firms. Brandt et al. (2013) found that the misallocation of capital between state and non-state
sectors tended to increase after 1997. These findings indicate that misallocation is expected to
increase in relatively capital intensive industries, and/or in industries dominated by state-owned
firms. Furthermore, it is possible that the spatial concentration of industries contributes to
improving allocation eciency because spatial concentration is likely to enhance competition
among firms. Thus, less-productive firms are expected to exit the market and, consequently,
production resources are allocated to more productive firms.
To explore the factors that change the variations in allocation eciency, a regression analysis
is conducted, using three-digit industrial sectors. The explained variables are the changes of
within-allocation eciencies (cov j and covSj ) during 2004–2007. The explanatory variables
are market share by ownership (State, Private+, and Foreign), aggregate industry-level capital-
labor ratio, and the Ellison-Glaeser (EG) industry-concentration index (Ellison and Glaeser,
1997). The market shares are measured using gross output, and the EG index is based on
county-level regions and the number of firm-level employees, such as:
EG j =
PM
m=1(s jm   sm)2  

1  PMm=1 s2mH j
1  PMm=1 s2m 1   H j ; (32)
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where i, j, and m denote firm, industry, and county, respectively, and:
s jm =
x jmPM
m=1 x jm
; sm =
PJ
j=1 x jmPJ
j=1
PM
m=1 x jm
; H j =
N jX
i2 j
 
xi2 jP
i2 j xi2 j
!2
;
where x is the number of employees. All explanatory variables are based on observations in
2004.
Table 3: Regression results
Explained variables: covSj cov j
Regressors Coef.
Output share (State, 2004) s 0.052 0.030
(0.049) (0.044)
Output share (Private+, 2004) p 0.171 0.159
(0.028) (0.029)
Output share (Foreign, 2004)  f 0.071 0.058
(0.024) (0.023)
Ellison-Glaeser Index (2004) EG  0.393 0.010
(0.250) (0.193)
logK=L (2004) KL  0.026  0.027
(0.006) (0.006)
Likelihood ratio tests (p-value)
Null: s = p 0.008 0.004
Null: s =  f 0.644 0.504
Null: p =  f 0.000 0.000
Sample size: 158
Notes: The sample is based on the number of three-digit industrial sectors,
except sector #379. Asterisks ***, **, and * indicate significant levels at
0.1%, 1%, and 5%, respectively.
Table 3 reports the regression results.7) The market shares of private and foreign firms have
positive and significant coecients, while the market share of state-owned firms is insignificant.
The logK=L has a significantly negative relationship with changes in allocation eciency. The
coecients of EG index show negative values that are not significant for covSj and cov j.
Contrary to expectations, the spatial concentration of industries does not have a positive eect
on the improvement in allocation eciency. These results indicate that changes in allocation
eciency tend to improve in industries with private firms having higher market shares, and/or
in relatively labor intensive industries.
Exploring the magnitude of the allocation eciency level is also useful. Table 4 provides
the level of covariance terms within an industry and between industries. A comparison of panels
(I) and (II) shows a small dierence and the same tendency. Industry averages of the within-
industry covariance terms fall between 0.22–0.24. These figures are not very small compared
with those of other countries. According to Bartelsman et al. (2013; Table 1), the covari-
ance term averages during 1993–2001 for eight countries were 0.51 (United States), 0.15 (UK),
0.28 (Germany), 0.24 (France), 0.30 (Netherlands), 0.16 (Hungary), -0.03 (Romania), and 0.04
(Slovenia). China’s manufacturing sector is at the same level as Germany’s. However, the
7)Because the sector #397 has negative extreme values for covSj and cov j, as shown in Figure 1, the sector is
eliminated from the regression analysis.
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between-industry covariance terms are very low, indicating negative values for several years
and implying that improving the allocation eciency between industries can make a significant
contribution to increasing aggregate manufacturing TFP growth.
Table 4: Level of the covariance terms (J = 159)
(I) Augmented OP decomposition
t J 1
P
j cov jt ˜covt
2004 0.2387 0.0377
2005 0.2482 0.0194
2006 0.2467 0.0093
2007 0.2321 0.0123
(II) Augmented MP decomposition
J 1
P
j covSjt ˜cov
S
t
t = 1 t = 2 t = 1 t = 2 t = 1 t = 2
2004 2005 0.2324 0.2404 0.0377 0.0194
2005 2006 0.2421 0.2408 0.0194 0.0093
2006 2007 0.2368 0.2253 0.0093 0.0123
2004 2007 0.2269 0.2316 0.0377 0.0123
In summary, allocation eciency between industries worsened during 2004–2007, and a
variation existed in the changes of within-industry allocation eciency among industrial sec-
tors. The within-allocation eciency worsened for the sectors that use more capital and have
firms with relatively higher state-owned market shares. These findings are consistent with those
of Chen, et al. (2011) and Brandt, et al. (2013).
5.2 Allocation Eciency of Ownership Groups by Industrial Sector
The previous section showed the degree of allocation eciency within each industrial sector and
between industrial sectors. This section focuses on the allocation eciency of ownership groups
by three-digit industrial sector. The ownership groups are defined as j 2 fState (S ), Private+
(P), and Foreign (F) sectorsg (J = 3). Section 4 provides a definition of each sector. The author
examines the extent of allocation eciency within each ownership group and between groups
using the three-digit industrial sector, and the following ADOP decomposition equation:
(i) =
1
3
X
j2fS ;P;Fg
h
Sj (i) + cov
S
j (i) + ent j(i) + ext j(i)
i
+  ˜cov(i):
Note that i denotes a three-digit industrial sector in this section and the ADOP decomposition
applies separately for each i = 1; 2; : : : ; I. Because the three-digit industrial classification is
relatively narrow, several industries have few or no firms in any of the three ownership sectors.
To focus on the industries in which the three ownership sectors coexist, this analysis is con-
ducted on the three-digit industrial sectors with more than 50 firms for each ownership sector.
As a result, I = 75 industrial sectors are used in this section.
5.2.1 Allocation Eciency between Ownership Groups
Figure 2 presents the allocation eciency between three ownership groups ( ˜cov(i)) during
2004–2007. Panel (A) of Figure 2 exhibits the plots of aggregate productivity changes (i),
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Figure 2: Changes in allocation eciency between ownership groups during 2004–2007
Notes: Red-colored plots denote industries with positive  ˜cov values in Panel (A), whereas blue-
colored plots denote industries with negative  ˜cov values.
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and the changes in allocation eciency between the three ownership groups,  ˜cov(i). Al-
though the average of  ˜cov(i) is almost zero ( 0.007), it varies among industries, ranging from
 0.114 to 0.09. In all, 30 industrial sectors are plotted in the positive area of the vertical axis
( ˜cov(i) > 0), indicating that these industries tend to improve resource allocation among the
three ownership groups.
To investigate the source of the variation in  ˜cov(i), it is rewritten as follows (suppress i to
ease notation):
 ˜cov =
X
j2fS ;P;Fg
(x j2y j2   x j1y j1)
=
X
j2fS ;P;Fg
(y j2x j2 + x j1y j2)
(33)
where x jt = w jt   1=JP j w jt and y jt = ˜ jt   1=JP j ˜ jt for t = 1; 2. x jt and y jt denote changes
in the demeaned aggregate productivity and market share for each ownership sector during
2004–2007. The relationship among the three variables ( ˜cov, x jt, and y jt) is plotted in
Panels (B)–(D) of Figure 2 by ownership. The red-colored plots denote industries with positive
 ˜cov values in Panel (A), whereas the blue-colored plots denote industries with negative  ˜cov
values.8)
As shown in Panel (B), the State sector’s market shares decreased in most industrial sectors,
and red plots in Panel (B) are primarily distributed in the third quadrant. This result indicates
that resource allocation between ownership groups ( ˜cov) tends to improve in industries in
which the State sector’s market share and productivity both decrease. In contrast, the blue plots
in Panel B are primarily distributed in the fourth quadrant, indicating that the resource allocation
between ownership groups are likely to worsen in industries in which the State sector’s market
share decreases but productivity increases.
Panel (C) shows the relationship between the changes in the Private+ sector’s market share
and productivity. Contrary to Panel (B), the red and blue plots are primarily distributed in
the first and second quadrants, respectively, indicating that the resource allocation between
ownership groups tends to improve in industries in which the Private+ sector’s market share
and productivity both increase and worsen in industries in which the Private+ sector’s market
share increases but productivity decreases. In contrast, the Foreign sector (Panel (D)) does not
show a clear relationship between red and blue plots.
In summary, the allocation eciency between ownership sectors tends to improve in in-
dustries in which the market share moves from the less-productive State sector to the more-
productive Private+ sector. In contrast, the allocation eciency tends to worsen in industries
in which 1) the State sector’s productivity relatively increases despite a decrease in its market
share or 2) the Private+ sector’s productivity does not grow compared with the other sectors
despite an increase in its market share.
5.2.2 Within-Eects for Each Ownership Group
Figure 3 reports the histograms of the within-eects. The vertical axis defines the number
of three-digit industrial sectors (i = 1; 2; : : : ; 75). Panels (A), (B) and (C) show allocation
8)Note that the first and third quadrants in Panels (B)–(D) indicate the positive relationship between the changes
in market share and productivity. However, this positive relationship does not necessarily produce positive  ˜cov
values. As is clear from Equation (33),  ˜cov does not necessarily become positive even if the sign of x j2 is the
same direction as that of y j2 for each j 2 fS ; P; Fg.
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(C) Exit eects within a group j (extSj (i), j =State, Private+, Foreign)
Figure 3: Decomposition of the within-eect by ownership during 2004–2007
Notes: The vertical axis shows the number of three-digit industrial sectors (i =
1; 2; : : : ; 75).
20
eciency covSj (i), entry eects ent
S
j (i), and exit eects ext
S
j (i) within a group j 2 fS ; P; Fg,
respectively.
Panel (A) shows that the means of these histograms is  0.007 (State), 0.020 (Private+),
and  0.007 (Foreign), and that the shares of the number of sectors with covSj (i) > 0 are
46:7%, 76:0%, and 56%, respectively. Although the values of covSj (i) are distributed broadly
for each group, the Private+ group tends to improve its allocation eciency among firms dur-
ing 2004–2007. The entry eect in Panel (B) shows that the means for each group are 0.019
(State),  0.14 (Private+), and  0.007 (Foreign), and the shares of the number of sectors with
entSj (i) > 0 are 48.0%, 21.3%, and 29.3%, respectively. This result indicates that new entry
firms in the Private+ and Foreign groups during 2004–2007 have, on average, lower productiv-
ity than existing firms for each group. Consequently, they have a negative eect on aggregate
productivity growth. Furthermore, the exit eect of the Private+ group shown in Panel (C) is
also small. The means are 0.026 (State), 0.0019 (Private+), and 0.003 (Foreign), and the shares
of the number of sectors with extSj (i) > 0 are 85.3%, 53.3%, and 85.3%, respectively, implying
that relatively nonproductive firms in the Private+ group are not likely to exit the market.
In summary, the Private+ sector tends to have more industrial sectors improving allocation
eciency among firms, compared with State and Foreign sectors. However, the entry and exit
eects for Private+ are very weak. In particular, the entry eect has negative values for many
industrial sectors, indicating that new firms in the Private+ sector tend to be less productive than
existing firms and drive down aggregate productivity growth.
6 Conclusions
Are changes in resource allocation important to driving the growth of aggregate TFP? Answer-
ing this question requires a quantitative measure of allocation eciency. This paper provides
a new measure of allocation eciency that is an extension of the productivity decomposition
methods proposed by Olley and Pakes (1996) andMelitz and Polanec (2015). This newmeasure
enables us to simultaneously capture the degree of misallocation within a group and between
groups, and parallel to capturing the contribution of entering and exiting firms to aggregate TFP
growth. Because the methods used by Olley and Pakes (1996) and Melitz and Polanec (2015)
cannot capture the degree of allocation eciency between groups, this new measure can be
considered a group-wise extension of their methods.
The measure of allocation eciency is applied to China’s manufacturing firm-level data
from 2004 to 2007. This paper uses two definitions of groups: (1) 159 industrial groups based
on a three-digit industrial classification and (2) three ownership groups (State, Private+, For-
eign sectors). Firm-level productivity used to calculate productivity decomposition is estimated
using a structural estimation method proposed by Gandhi et al. (2013). The main findings of
this paper are summarized as follows:
1. New entering and exiting firms did not contribute significantly to the increase in growth
of aggregate manufacturing TFP.
2. Misallocation between 159 industrial sectors tended to increase during 2004–2007, which
reduced aggregate TFP growth during 2004–2007 by an annual average of 0.635% points.
The changes in allocation eciency within each industrial sector during 2004–2007 var-
ied widely among sectors. However its average is almost zero, indicating that the within-
eects do not significantly aect aggregate TFP growth.
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3. Misallocation within an industrial sector was found to increase for sectors using more
capital and having firms with relatively higher state-owned market shares. These findings
are consistent with those of Chen, et al. (2011) and Brandt, et al. (2013).
4. Misallocation between three ownership groups declined in 30 of the 75 three-digit indus-
trial sectors, indicating that these industries improved resource allocation among the three
ownership groups. Furthermore, misallocation tended to decline in industries wherein
market shares move from the less-productive State sector to the more-productive Pri-
vate+ sector. In contrast, misallocation tended to worsen in industries in which 1) the
State sector’s productivity relatively increases despite decreases in its market share or 2)
the Private+ sector’s productivity does not grow compared with that of the other sectors
despite increases in its market share.
5. The Private+ sector has more industrial sectors improving the within-allocation eciency
among firms compared with the State and Foreign sectors. However, the entry and exit
eects for the Private+ sector were very small. In particular, the entry eect has negative
values for many industrial sectors, indicating that new firms in the Private+ sector tended
to be less productive than existing firms, driving down aggregate productivity growth.
These empirical results lead us to conclude that misallocation in China’s manufacturing sec-
tor tended to increase during 2004–2007 that, particularly the increase in misallocation between
industrial sectors had a significant negative eect on aggregate TFP growth. Furthermore, al-
location eciency tended to improve in industrial sectors in which 1) the production process
is not capital intensive and 2) non-state-owned firms are relatively productive and have higher
market share than state-owned firms.
What is behind the behavior of allocation eciency in China? According to previous stud-
ies, financial frictions are believed to be an important source of misallocation (Caggese and
Cun˜at, 2013; Midrigan and Xu, 2014). The increase in misallocation in China could be at-
tributed to unequal access to factor resources, such as capital from bank loans, subsidies, and
land, between state-owned and non-state owned firms. Since the 2000s, one debate has been
over the state sector’s advantageous access to capital resources compared with the private sector,
a phenomenon called Guojin Mintui (i.e., the state advances, the private sector retreats). Such a
favorable environment for the state sector may impede the growth of the private sector, causing
resource allocation to deteriorate. In addition, as Brandt et al. (2013) argued, regional policies
such as Xibu Kaifa (i.e., develop the great west) may be related to the increase in misallocation.
If the government promotes the reallocation of investment resources toward less-productive
sectors, doing so should worsen resource allocation.
Identifying the source of misallocation is challenging, but misallocation worsened in China’s
manufacturing sector during 2004–2007, in accordance with the findings of this paper. There-
fore, reexamining the regional development policies and the equity of competitive conditions
among firms in the financial market in terms of optimal resource allocation is crucially impor-
tant.
Finally, the dierence should be noted between the two measures for allocation eciency:
1) the covariance type, originally developed by Olley and Pakes (1996), and 2) the dispersion
type, discussed by Hsieh and Klenow (2009). The former assesses the degree of allocation ef-
ficiency using the relationship between market share and productivity, whereas the latter uses
the degree of dispersion (e.g., standard deviations) of firm-level productivity within a sector
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as the measure of allocation eciency. A higher covariance measure indicates more-ecient
resource allocation, whereas a lower dispersion measure indicates more-ecient resource al-
location. However, these two measure are likely to provide inconsistent results because the
decrease in the dispersion might lead to a decline in the covariance. What are the main sources
of this inconsistency? Although this issue is beyond the scope of this paper, it must be resolved.
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Table A1: Average Input Elasticities of Output (1)
GNR OLS
Industry K L M K + L + M K L M K + L + M
131 0.0634 0.1994 0.7289 0.9916 0.0065 0.0541 0.9216 0.9822
132 0.0702 0.1924 0.7616 1.0241 0.0168 0.0582 0.9322 1.0072
133 0.0863 0.1448 0.7445 0.9755 0.0030 0.0322 0.9367 0.9719
134 0.1172 0.1136 0.7209 0.9516 0.0460 0.0168 0.9315 0.9943
135 0.0617 0.1796 0.7224 0.9637 0.0002 0.0376 0.9514 0.9892
136 0.0734 0.1418 0.7513 0.9665 0.0186 0.0510 0.9283 0.9978
137 0.0664 0.1029 0.7238 0.8930 0.0207 0.0327 0.9043 0.9577
139 0.0610 0.1380 0.7099 0.9088 0.0095 0.0481 0.9140 0.9716
141 0.0813 0.1797 0.7242 0.9852 0.0226 0.0821 0.9063 1.0111
142 0.0783 0.1523 0.7357 0.9663 0.0147 0.0518 0.9294 0.9959
143 0.0847 0.1638 0.7174 0.9659 0.0271 0.0567 0.9052 0.9890
144 0.0757 0.1577 0.7388 0.9721 -0.0006 0.0493 0.9432 0.9919
145 0.0610 0.1449 0.7369 0.9428 0.0158 0.0450 0.9261 0.9868
146 0.1027 0.1234 0.7238 0.9500 0.0232 0.0205 0.9521 0.9958
149 0.0748 0.1632 0.7159 0.9539 0.0187 0.0653 0.9043 0.9884
151 0.0897 0.1875 0.7183 0.9955 -0.0161 0.0556 0.9445 0.9841
152 0.0971 0.1914 0.6619 0.9504 0.0094 0.0690 0.9209 0.9993
153 0.1222 0.1941 0.7016 1.0179 0.0265 0.0619 0.9225 1.0109
154 0.0826 0.1570 0.7173 0.9570 0.0318 0.0602 0.9220 1.0141
171 0.0560 0.1539 0.7647 0.9746 0.0075 0.0514 0.9280 0.9870
172 0.0424 0.1032 0.7496 0.8952 -0.0032 0.0303 0.9457 0.9728
173 0.0627 0.1342 0.7247 0.9216 0.0091 0.0378 0.9155 0.9624
174 0.0600 0.1317 0.7896 0.9812 0.0092 0.0452 0.9250 0.9794
175 0.0640 0.1391 0.7617 0.9649 0.0174 0.0574 0.9194 0.9942
176 0.0627 0.1582 0.7451 0.9659 0.0190 0.0838 0.8790 0.9818
181 0.0718 0.1672 0.7189 0.9578 0.0225 0.0977 0.8583 0.9785
182 0.0565 0.1947 0.7277 0.9788 0.0214 0.0769 0.8786 0.9768
183 0.0778 0.1057 0.7241 0.9077 0.0231 0.0765 0.8708 0.9703
191 0.0655 0.2402 0.7489 1.0546 0.0100 0.0597 0.9180 0.9876
192 0.0735 0.1879 0.7306 0.9920 0.0194 0.0913 0.8741 0.9847
193 0.0861 0.1732 0.7528 1.0122 0.0205 0.0255 0.9246 0.9706
194 0.0749 0.0877 0.7667 0.9293 0.0165 0.0114 0.9088 0.9367
201 0.0542 0.2121 0.7218 0.9880 0.0179 0.0836 0.8978 0.9993
202 0.0860 0.1464 0.7348 0.9671 0.0221 0.0318 0.9173 0.9713
203 0.0583 0.1632 0.7274 0.9489 0.0198 0.0789 0.8634 0.9621
204 0.0599 0.1880 0.7341 0.9820 0.0318 0.0753 0.8561 0.9632
211 0.0562 0.1642 0.7333 0.9536 0.0197 0.0593 0.9040 0.9830
213 0.0745 0.1517 0.7723 0.9985 0.0286 0.0425 0.9237 0.9949
219 0.0643 0.1974 0.7521 1.0138 0.0229 0.0827 0.8596 0.9653
221 0.0603 0.0893 0.7392 0.8888 -0.0010 0.0254 0.9511 0.9755
222 0.0734 0.1677 0.7600 1.0011 0.0030 0.0393 0.9435 0.9858
223 0.0711 0.1493 0.7592 0.9797 0.0206 0.0594 0.9047 0.9847
231 0.1018 0.1601 0.7199 0.9817 0.0516 0.0599 0.9082 1.0197
232 0.0572 0.2268 0.7089 0.9928 0.0222 0.1212 0.8961 1.0394
241 0.0621 0.1441 0.7566 0.9628 0.0298 0.0582 0.9022 0.9902
242 0.0652 0.1575 0.7462 0.9690 0.0245 0.0683 0.8833 0.9760
243 0.0419 0.1001 0.7378 0.8798 0.0149 0.1067 0.8669 0.9885
244 0.0498 0.1578 0.7346 0.9422 0.0270 0.0853 0.8739 0.9862
245 0.0541 0.1714 0.7740 0.9995 0.0361 0.0371 0.9193 0.9925
251 0.1181 0.0982 0.7644 0.9807 0.0216 0.0335 0.9280 0.9831
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Table A2: Average Input Elasticities of Output (2)
GNR OLS
Industry K L M K + L + M K L M K + L + M
252 0.1122 0.0821 0.7190 0.9134 0.0055 0.0351 0.9166 0.9573
261 0.0825 0.1177 0.7385 0.9387 0.0196 0.0362 0.9228 0.9786
262 0.0940 0.1021 0.7336 0.9298 0.0254 0.0349 0.9179 0.9781
263 0.0547 0.1988 0.7315 0.9851 0.0107 0.0491 0.9313 0.9912
264 0.0882 0.1380 0.7605 0.9867 0.0246 0.0374 0.9217 0.9837
265 0.1134 0.1100 0.7676 0.9910 0.0184 0.0432 0.9097 0.9712
266 0.1022 0.1127 0.7246 0.9395 0.0239 0.0504 0.8965 0.9708
267 0.0896 0.1262 0.7334 0.9492 0.0282 0.0341 0.9294 0.9916
271 0.0896 0.1727 0.7284 0.9907 0.0149 0.0454 0.9213 0.9816
272 0.0867 0.1940 0.6718 0.9525 0.0019 0.1003 0.8855 0.9877
273 0.0487 0.1650 0.6903 0.9040 0.0446 0.0668 0.8543 0.9657
274 0.0535 0.2078 0.6538 0.9152 0.0278 0.0797 0.8999 1.0074
275 0.1050 0.1914 0.6879 0.9843 0.0300 0.0759 0.9308 1.0367
276 0.0471 0.2479 0.6476 0.9425 0.0126 0.1263 0.8707 1.0096
277 0.1270 0.1847 0.7056 1.0172 0.0321 0.0667 0.8909 0.9897
281 0.0957 0.1136 0.7657 0.9750 0.0273 0.0116 0.9476 0.9864
282 0.0807 0.0481 0.7924 0.9212 0.0114 0.0284 0.9465 0.9862
291 0.0412 0.0785 0.7467 0.8664 -0.0206 0.0093 0.9770 0.9657
292 0.0798 0.1088 0.7500 0.9386 0.0343 0.0291 0.9068 0.9703
293 0.0815 0.1279 0.7174 0.9268 0.0279 0.0583 0.8923 0.9785
294 0.0406 0.1606 0.7384 0.9395 0.0023 0.0445 0.9463 0.9931
295 0.0930 0.1371 0.7401 0.9703 0.0365 0.0883 0.8887 1.0135
296 0.0928 0.1572 0.7398 0.9898 0.0014 0.0494 0.9180 0.9688
299 0.1128 0.1091 0.7310 0.9529 0.0368 0.0674 0.8678 0.9720
301 0.0793 0.1124 0.7751 0.9668 0.0177 0.0433 0.9243 0.9854
302 0.0790 0.1374 0.7646 0.9810 0.0096 0.0391 0.9161 0.9648
303 0.1075 0.1662 0.7455 1.0192 0.0312 0.0528 0.8950 0.9790
304 0.0454 0.1314 0.7755 0.9522 0.0134 0.0570 0.8981 0.9685
305 0.0603 0.1454 0.7878 0.9934 -0.0015 0.0108 0.9770 0.9863
306 0.0965 0.1083 0.7533 0.9580 0.0357 0.0430 0.8964 0.9750
307 0.1021 0.1732 0.7509 1.0262 0.0497 0.0840 0.8518 0.9855
308 0.0718 0.1530 0.7614 0.9861 0.0275 0.0798 0.8826 0.9899
309 0.0791 0.1006 0.7529 0.9327 0.0315 0.0570 0.8656 0.9541
311 0.0950 0.0974 0.7332 0.9256 0.0140 0.0286 0.9301 0.9727
312 0.0801 0.1136 0.7401 0.9339 0.0275 0.0322 0.9313 0.9909
313 0.1103 0.1261 0.6973 0.9338 0.0208 0.0387 0.9178 0.9773
314 0.1040 0.1765 0.7294 1.0099 0.0384 0.0595 0.8938 0.9917
315 0.0980 0.1042 0.6922 0.8943 0.0148 0.0633 0.9006 0.9787
316 0.0955 0.1138 0.7221 0.9313 0.0348 0.0098 0.9473 0.9919
319 0.0903 0.1270 0.7249 0.9421 0.0374 0.0260 0.9170 0.9803
321 0.0839 0.1355 0.7424 0.9618 0.0119 0.0439 0.9296 0.9854
322 0.0861 0.0609 0.7697 0.9168 0.0167 0.0234 0.9493 0.9895
323 0.0865 0.1462 0.7770 1.0097 0.0105 0.0564 0.9213 0.9882
324 0.0670 0.1305 0.7297 0.9272 0.0161 0.0505 0.9242 0.9908
331 0.0706 0.1202 0.7456 0.9364 0.0135 0.0511 0.9123 0.9768
332 0.1061 -0.0025 0.6946 0.7982 0.0185 0.0630 0.8942 0.9757
333 0.0786 0.0983 0.7422 0.9191 0.0128 0.0279 0.9319 0.9726
334 0.0714 0.1358 0.7749 0.9821 0.0189 0.0465 0.9223 0.9877
335 0.0740 0.0947 0.7844 0.9531 0.0136 0.0414 0.9218 0.9768
341 0.0841 0.1503 0.7447 0.9791 0.0224 0.0690 0.8878 0.9791
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Table A3: Average Input Elasticities of Output (3)
GNR OLS
Industry K L M K + L + M K L M K + L + M
342 0.0805 0.1268 0.7377 0.9450 0.0332 0.0627 0.8824 0.9783
343 0.0963 0.1509 0.7603 1.0075 0.0243 0.0527 0.8974 0.9744
344 0.0676 0.1155 0.7736 0.9567 0.0146 0.0599 0.9049 0.9794
345 0.0941 0.1437 0.7603 0.9981 0.0209 0.0540 0.9033 0.9783
346 0.1101 0.1111 0.7417 0.9629 0.0415 0.0810 0.8395 0.9620
347 0.0618 0.1161 0.7576 0.9355 0.0179 0.0646 0.8787 0.9612
348 0.0737 0.1036 0.7587 0.9361 0.0201 0.0558 0.8871 0.9630
349 0.0770 0.0986 0.7531 0.9286 0.0302 0.0543 0.8741 0.9586
351 0.0612 0.1450 0.7308 0.9369 0.0011 0.0489 0.9126 0.9627
352 0.0841 0.1286 0.7250 0.9378 0.0295 0.0501 0.9137 0.9933
353 0.0847 0.2072 0.7482 1.0401 0.0167 0.0545 0.8990 0.9702
354 0.0886 0.1248 0.7407 0.9541 0.0285 0.0327 0.9130 0.9742
355 0.1090 0.1529 0.7272 0.9891 0.0385 0.0458 0.8835 0.9679
356 0.0671 0.1418 0.7560 0.9649 0.0351 0.0389 0.9116 0.9856
357 0.0873 0.1693 0.7414 0.9980 0.0207 0.0478 0.9061 0.9746
358 0.0927 0.1439 0.7434 0.9800 0.0382 0.0689 0.8886 0.9957
359 0.0807 0.1055 0.7507 0.9370 0.0216 0.0324 0.9187 0.9727
361 0.1013 0.1506 0.7216 0.9735 0.0191 0.0348 0.9071 0.9611
362 0.0957 0.1591 0.7141 0.9689 0.0500 0.0696 0.8577 0.9773
363 0.0517 0.2190 0.7237 0.9945 0.0184 0.0290 0.9555 1.0029
364 0.0655 0.1210 0.7296 0.9161 0.0167 0.0365 0.9313 0.9845
365 0.0486 0.1188 0.7453 0.9127 0.0108 0.0456 0.9045 0.9609
366 0.0864 0.1643 0.7086 0.9592 0.0314 0.0550 0.8605 0.9468
367 0.0499 0.1574 0.7319 0.9392 0.0084 0.0457 0.9388 0.9929
368 0.1239 0.1767 0.6791 0.9797 0.0521 0.0679 0.8685 0.9885
369 0.0619 0.1883 0.7120 0.9621 0.0245 0.0683 0.8948 0.9876
371 0.1036 0.1659 0.7094 0.9789 0.0268 0.0479 0.9060 0.9808
372 0.0837 0.1787 0.7386 1.0010 0.0212 0.0637 0.9069 0.9917
373 0.0597 0.1330 0.7775 0.9702 0.0148 0.0401 0.9243 0.9792
374 0.0525 0.1364 0.7953 0.9843 0.0244 0.0603 0.8977 0.9824
375 0.0716 0.1907 0.7099 0.9722 0.0060 0.1141 0.8559 0.9760
376 0.1880 0.1024 0.6312 0.9216 0.0996 0.0775 0.7880 0.9651
379 0.1005 0.1390 0.7047 0.9442 0.0242 0.0662 0.8738 0.9642
391 0.0877 0.1614 0.7573 1.0063 0.0041 0.0608 0.9060 0.9710
392 0.0914 0.1608 0.7361 0.9883 0.0233 0.0555 0.8907 0.9694
393 0.1069 0.1199 0.7665 0.9933 0.0308 0.0481 0.8979 0.9769
394 0.0946 0.1439 0.7637 1.0022 0.0210 0.0547 0.8831 0.9588
395 0.0687 0.1776 0.7767 1.0230 0.0120 0.0657 0.9079 0.9855
396 0.0391 0.1043 0.7634 0.9068 -0.0018 0.0383 0.9422 0.9787
397 0.0838 0.1579 0.7695 1.0112 0.0195 0.0659 0.8866 0.9720
399 0.0776 0.1952 0.7147 0.9876 0.0263 0.1081 0.8499 0.9844
401 0.0758 0.2030 0.7182 0.9970 0.0152 0.1089 0.8292 0.9533
403 0.1068 0.1534 0.7349 0.9951 0.0367 0.0762 0.8401 0.9530
404 0.0699 0.1789 0.7348 0.9836 0.0228 0.1064 0.8245 0.9537
405 0.1089 0.1737 0.7036 0.9862 0.0442 0.0905 0.8335 0.9682
406 0.1012 0.1455 0.7319 0.9786 0.0405 0.0884 0.8547 0.9836
407 0.0529 0.1717 0.7740 0.9986 0.0221 0.1057 0.8593 0.9871
409 0.0599 0.1550 0.7136 0.9286 0.0294 0.0782 0.8384 0.9461
411 0.0757 0.1692 0.7121 0.9570 0.0230 0.0608 0.8947 0.9785
412 0.1003 0.1883 0.6966 0.9852 0.0297 0.0653 0.8857 0.9807
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Table A4: Average Input Elasticities of Output (4)
GNR OLS
Industry K L M K + L + M K L M K + L + M
413 0.0577 0.1592 0.7105 0.9273 0.0204 0.1097 0.8291 0.9592
414 0.0952 0.1821 0.7154 0.9927 0.0256 0.0688 0.8694 0.9638
415 0.0540 0.1844 0.7370 0.9754 0.0436 0.0713 0.8444 0.9594
419 0.1318 0.0332 0.7012 0.8662 0.1157 0.0305 0.7934 0.9396
421 0.0701 0.1289 0.7169 0.9159 0.0287 0.0871 0.8574 0.9732
422 0.0656 0.1458 0.7631 0.9746 0.0352 0.0401 0.9097 0.9849
429 0.1245 0.1203 0.7062 0.9510 0.0596 0.0632 0.8603 0.9831
431 0.0774 0.0868 0.7719 0.9361 0.0365 0.0383 0.8885 0.9633
432 0.0485 0.0931 0.7475 0.8891 0.0211 0.0686 0.8541 0.9438
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